thorizcd to participate, in varying degrees, in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.
Yost calls for a curtailment of this growing trend toward the military's domination of foreign policy decision-making. He recognizes the real difficulties involved in reversing the trend but argues that not only our country but the entire world is in danger if we do not do so. One cannot believe that Yost is crying wolf. Much has been made lately of tho growing power of the President, and rightly so. If those who perceive a gradual movement toward dictatorship have any case at all, it surely rests with the strength being concentrated in the executive branch, an Occurrence which seems more ominous, given the military's growing role and power.
Yost does not stop with a general criticism. He lists several ways that the powcr of the military could legitimately be curtailed. First of all, he suggcsts a three-quarter cut in the service attach& (military intelligence) assigned to U.S. embassies, a drastic reduction of the U.S. military officer corps, and a threeqiiartors cut in the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Yost's book should have appcared six months earlier; George McCovem needed the support.) Secondly, he envisions an expansion of the activities of the State Department to encompass some duties which have traditionally been handled by the military and/or the CIA. Finally, he recommends that the National Sccurity Council, if it is going to remain dominated by military men, confine itself to giving military advice. which can then be related to conditions cxisting in the international community by others possessing broader perspectives.
The weakest portion of The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affuirs is its conclusion. Yost, undoubtedly influenced by his later years with the United Nations, looks to that institution for a ray of hope. Pointing out that the United Nations has lacked political power primarily because the superpowers have willed it that way, he maintains that the threat of nuclear holocaust brought on by the escalating arms racc should move the superpowers to reevaluate their relationship to the U.N. Unfortunately, the vision of a strcngthencd United Nations with meaningful enforcement powers, though most palatablc, seems quite remote.
One of the most interesting off- 
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Men have always been concerned with the standards of right and wrong by which they might judgc thc ordering of their common life. Such standards have been provided by tradition, by the gods or by various modes of philosophy. Perhaps thc greatest philosophic doctrines wcrc the classical teachings of Plato and Aristotle, which, through contemplating the unchanging natiire of things, put forward standards so pure as to be unattainable in social fact.
In the persons of Descartes and Hobbes classical philosophy was rejected by early modernity on the ground that its metaphysics was untenable. Yet the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still believed that nature provided il basis for the rights of men and a guide by which social actions might be judged. Their concern was not for esoteric utopias h i t for rulcs natirrally acccptablc to all, rules which cnuld guarantee minimal rights and security.
Even these standards did not go irnchallengcd for long. Bentham dcclared their talk of natural rights to be just so much "nonsense on stilts." In placc of natural rights he advanced the criterion of whether an action's consequences maximized pleasure and minimized pain. Unlike natural rights, the existence of pleasure and pain seemed clear. While philosophers of the p s t might quarrel with the crudeness of Bentham's standards, they recognized that Bentham's approach allowed choicc between altcmotives, a possibility soon to be virtually denied in social and philosophic thought.
Economists came to the conclusion that one could not really speak of utility as a p r o p e q of objects or actions but only as an effcct induced in persons. Fresh from his travels in ' Viennese circles, Lionel Robbins proclaimed that there was no scientific basis by which to compare the cffects on one man with those on another. One could not sum up the utilities which alternative courses of action produced in a number of pcoplc and then conclude that the action producing the highest total was most choiceworthy. Only those actions from which at least one of the affected bclicved himself to benefit, and none felt himself to lose, could be scientifically approved of. Nccdless to say, few such alternatives present themselves, and despite all the imagination and theorctical rigor ccoriomists have put to the task, their thcorics arc largely inapplicable to choices in the real world.
Anglo-American philosophers fared little bcttcr. Some ignored the question of interpersonal comparisons of utility and proceeded to outline a plethora of act-and-rule utilitarianisms whose complexity is exceeded only hy a common inability to provide :in acccptablc account of our commdn livcs. Some adopted the positivist doctrine that ethical assertions were meaningless and turned their attention to more important topics. Othcrs attemptcd to rescue chics from this critiqiie. Slowly, slowly the rcconstruction proceeded, often employing Wittgenstein's insights into language. Ethics was not simply n matter of cmotions, since it was expected that one could give generalizable reasons for one's claims. While the advances were made with great difficulty and were pcrhaps indispensable to further progress, it cmild hardly be said that their end result was in any way comprehcnsive.
So things stood until the recent publication of John Rawls's A T h c q of Justice. In a conceptual variation of eightecnth-century contract theory, Rawls synthesizes the insights of previous thinkers into what some critics have hailed a philosophic work of the first rank. He postulates a group of individuals nttcmpting to formiilatc the basic structures of their society while in the "original position" of ignorance of the particular goals thcy might later wish to pursue. They would, he claims, unanimously agrm to grant each the most extensive liberty compatible with an equal liberty for all others. They would agree that economic inequalities are tolerable only to the degree that they benefit the least advantaged. Rawls also believes that a rattier complex sct of priority rules through which these maxims could bc applied would be unanimously accepted.
Thus formulated, Rawls's theory adopts the most attractive features of welfare economics while avoiding its failings. He uses the economic notion of "lexical ordering" skillfully in the formulation of his priority rules, but he recognizes that the notorious question of interpersonal comparisons of utility is just the problem of the existence of "other minds" in wolf's clothing. More important, he sees that so long as it cannot givc more than formal guidance in the formation of preferences nor take full account of the inefficiency of the "political marketplacc," the strict CCOnomic approach is of only limited applicability to ethics. Having chosen his tools carefully, Rawls constnicts a theory by which he incorporates a stunning breadth of topics, ranging from civil disobedience and obligation to taxation and rate of savings.
Any work of so grand a scale will have its minor faults, and Rawls's is no cxception. Some subsections dealing with technical philosophic questions fail to advance the main theory, and his indulgence in a bit of social Darwinism is incongruous.
More significant is Rawls's acceptance of what he tcms the "natural duties" without presenting a rigorous philosophical justification. It places him in the tradition of Locke rather than of Spinoza and is indicative both of thc stature of his book and of our times. Rawls believes that ethics can be dealt with separate from problems of epistemology and metaphysics, as when he writes of Kant's ethics apart from the rest of the Kantian system. The tactic is a risky one. Rawls asserts a similarity between his own work and Aristotle's by citing a passage of the Ethics which appears prior to the "new beginning" Aristotle finds himself forced to make in light of the existence of 'intellectual as well as moral virtue. Indeed, Rawls's rejection of what he terms Aristotelian "perfectionism" on the ground that it would not receive unanimous support in "the original position" simply misses The Philosopher's point.
Disconcerting in a book of such great breadth, this shallowness manifests itself repeatedly. The natural duties, given a justification that is sketchy at best, arc further weakened when Rawls divorces them from such notions as obligation. .His account of human "development" from childhood notions of authority to more mature moralities of association and principlc ignores thc efforts of such thinkers as Arendt and Bergcr to give il greater depth to liberal social theory. When Rawls claims that mutual compliance with the principles advanced by his theory gives an adequate account of community, he gives the game away.
Community, after all, is a sentiment which rcsults from sharing a way of life. By admitting that his theory does not apply either to daily interactions or to ritual or to religion, while at the same time asserting that it does account for mmmunity, Rawls conjures a picture of the human condition that is all too familiar and far too limited.
The standards by which I criticize Rawls are not easily met. They have driven great minds to despair. "Oh to have lived in the days of Leibnitz," wrote Bertrand Russell, "when systems were still possible." Still, one suspects that most men have always found their times debilitating and that in the end it is not the age but the man that is crucial.
Rawls began his project faced with a bewildering multiplicity of problems. He has'spun a web whose intricacy demands admiration, but in so doing he has illustrated a greater truth. If, as the scholastic Bernard of Chartres (and not Francis Bacon) first noted, standing on the shoulders of giants permits us to see farther, tactics in the light of its own situation."
That would sccm to sum up thc very ~~i i l c a n nature of his program, which aims at nudging Chilc as fast as possible along the road to socialism, but always within the framcwork of what Chilean laws permit. In his first ycar in officc thosc laws pcrmitted a great deal-the nationalization of copper, massive efforts to accelerate the agrarian rcform process, takcovers of foreign and domestic companics, tho tiationalization of thc banking industry through governmcnt purchasing of the. shares of the banks. and so forth.
But thosc very laws provide also for an opposition which at the moment is bccoming increasingly vocal arid increasingly able to frustrate Allende in many of his goals. The opposition has, in effect, said j h t o ! (enough!) and has thrown numerous roadblocks in Allende's path. At this time, Allende appears to be revising some of his strategy in the light of thesc roadblocks, and there are some in Santiago who fccl that thc Comrade President may well yield to the urgings of his more radical supporters who want him to push ahead with his program evcn if it mcans he gocs outside the system to do it.
Aftcr reading the Debray-Allcnde convcrsations, howcvcr, one is struck with thc basic desire of Allelide to work within thc system. Yet if Allende do& stick to this approach, the very revolution which the Debray book proclaims in its titlc could be dcrailcd and Allcndc c d d go down in history as less of a rcvolutionary than he sues himself. That in essciicc is Allcndc's basic dilemma.
Whatcvcr the outcomi! of the ciirrent struggle in Chile, thc convcrsations in this book provide a muchneeded insight into Allcnde the man. One caution is in order. Intervicwcr and intcrvicwcd think much alike, and the Iaiipagc is clearly Marxistoriented. hiorcover, some of the rcfercnces to fact and history, particularly in Debray's footnotes, are woefully innccipte and one-sided. Dcbray clearly admires the Chilcan President, although hc is challcnging in thc questions he puts to Allende, who stylcs himself the "Comrade President." Undcr Allende, the goals of a rcvolutionary society are being sought through the laws of Chile and within the traditional framework of Chilean socicty. In a sense, Allende is working within the very system that he wants to change. This in tum explains some of Allcndc's problems, particularly those hc has with his own SOcialist Party, which is calling on him to move faster and, in some instances, go outside the traditional pattcms of Chilean behavior to make the desired changes.
But Allende is convinced that his approach is right-at least as far as Chile is concerncd. Over and over again, in answers to questions posed by Debray, he indicates that Chile is unique and must be regardcd as an individual case, that in judging Chilc and his performance one must keep the Chilcan reality in mind. In this conneetion Allcndc 'and Debray (in his introduction to the book) argue that, as prcsident, Allcndc is committed to his own legitimacy. Allcnde recognizcs that this poscs problems. nut he says at one point in his convcrsations with the French jour: nalist that "each leader must makc a concrete aiialysis of a concrete situation-this is the essence of Marxism. Thus, each country prcparcs its ow11
